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An ontological investigation of unimaginable events
Thomas Santoli1, Christoph Siebenbrunner1
Abstract
We show that, under mild assumptions, some unimaginable events - which we refer to as Black Swan
events - must necessarily occur. It follows as a corollary of our theorem that any computational model
of decision-making under uncertainty is incomplete in the sense that not all events that occur can be
taken into account. In the context of decision theory we argue that this constitutes a stronger sense of
uncertainty than Knightian uncertainty.
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1. Introduction
Ontology, loosely defined as “the study of what there is” (Hofweber, 2014), studies questions of the
existence of entities, their properties, and the relation between the two (Hofweber, 2014). So-called
ontological arguments traditionally are proofs of the existence of god, deducing this conclusion from a
set of properties attributed to the entity ‘god’2. In this article we apply the same technique to show the
existence of so-called Black Swan events.
The notion of Black Swan events, originally introduced in Taleb (2005), has been popularized by a
series of popular science books (Taleb, 2016). Its formalization is work in progress by Taleb (2017).
Their naming makes reference to the so-called problem of induction, defined by the Oxford English
Dictionary as “the process of inferring a general law or principle from the observation of particular
instances” (OED, 2017). It is attributed to David Hume, who stated that such arguments cannot be
made rigorous by deductive reasoning alone, given the lack for a justification of the assumption that yet
unobserved entities will share the same properties as those already observed (Hume and Selby-Bigge,
1896). The solution to the problem that this causes to scientific reasoning proposed by Popper (1935)
is to replace induction with falsification, the process of continuously trying to find empirical evidence
against the theses of a scientific theory (Vickers, 2016). This method was later rejected by critics as
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relying on a “whiff ” (some extent) of inductivism itself (Newton-Smith, 1981; Salmon, 1981).
The need for induction as part of the process as scientific discovery was already discussed by Aristotle,
who argued that scientists should infer explanatory principles from phenomena in order to deduce further
statements about them. Aristotle’s method was generally accepted by medieval thinkers and many ver-
sions of such methods were presented by philosophers including Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William
of Ockham, amongst others. The difficulty of arriving at general truths instead of accidental general-
izations was generally understood by these authors (Losee, 2001). A common way of presenting this
problem is to point out that the fact that all swans observed hitherto (in Europe) were white could lead an
observer to induce that all swans are white – a case of accidental predication that Duns Scotus seeked to
avoid by stating that the most that could be inferred from observations was their “aptitudinal union”, in
this case that swans could be white (Losee, 2001). In this sense, the discovery of a species of black swans
in Australia – cygnus atratus – during the voyages of the 17th century is a good exemplification of this
problem. First accounts of such sightings by the Dutch skipper Antony Caen in 1636 were met with skep-
ticism back home, until Willem de Vlamingh brought back real specimen to the continent over 60 years
later (Olsen, 2001). Taleb (2005) states this historical context as a reason for choosing cygnus atratus as
the namesake for events with large impact, incomputable probabilities, and surprise effect properties.
The theory of Black Swan events, under development by Taleb (2017), has already made significant
impact in popular language and general media. In this article we undertake to demonstrate that the
occurrence of such events is in fact implied by their definition. Several authors have written about Black
Swan events from a statistical and risk (management) theory perspective (apart from the already cited
works, further examples include e.g. Nafday (2009, 2011); Hilal et al. (2011); Taleb et al. (2012); Aven
(2013)). Taleb (2005); Yudkowsky (2008) discuss Black Swans in the context of human cognition and its
limitations. However, there are – to the best of our knowledge – no works looking at Black Swans from
an analytical perspective.
2. Definitions
A Black Swan is defined by Taleb (2017) as “a) a highly unexpected event [f]or a given observer [that]
b) carries large consequences, and c) is subjected to ex-post rationalization”.
In order to formalize this definition, we define a set X of all events. We define the predicate χ(x) to
denote that the event x ∈ X can be imagined (by a given observer). We will discuss further below what
it means in the context of our model to be able to imagine an event. In order to discuss the occurrence
or non-occurrence of events we further define ϕ(x) to denote an event that occurs. We make very few
assumptions about X, which are summarized by the axioms presented in section 3. Note that we do not
include a notion of time in our theory, i.e. the chronological ordering of the occurrence of an event and
its imagination by an observer carries no importance. We associate the non-imaginability of an event
to the property of being highly unexpected (denoted (a) in the definition by Taleb (2017)). We will see
later that the property of large consequences (b) follows from this definition. We do not include ex-post
rationalization (c) in our definition, as we do not consider it essential to the ontological nature of Black
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Swans. If we denote by B(x) the property that event x is a Black Swan, then its definition in our theory
reads:
B(x)⇔ ¬χ(x)
In order to be able to discuss the ‘size’ of consequences we introduce the partial order < which satisfies
the following axioms for all elements a, b, c ∈ X:
• Irreflexivity: ¬(a < a)
• Transitivity: (a < b) ∧ (b < c)⇒ a < c
Other than assuming a strict rather than a weak partial order, which we do for technical convenience here,
this relation is consistent with von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944). It shares the important transitivity property, a consistent equivalent for continuity under a strict
partial order can be formulated, completeness and independence are not required but fully consistent with
our theory. In this spirit, we will sometimes treat the notion of event y having greater consequences than
event x, i.e. x < y, as semantically equivalent y being ‘worse’ (i.e. yielding lower utility for a given
observer) than x. This semantic interpretation does not affect the generality of the argument, and we
stress that our argument does not require that the size of an event is in any way related to its utility for an
observer. This interpretation does, however, help to emphasize the particular importance of unimaginable
events when they are associated with negative outcomes (for a given observer).
Our definition of Black Swan events may be seen as stricter than that of Taleb (2017) in one sense, as
non-imaginability can be seen as a stronger requirement than being highly unexpected. It may also be
seen as wider in the sense that it does not require ex-post rationalization. In any case, we consider it a
highly important class of events, as becomes clear when it is viewed in the context of decision-making
under risk and uncertainty.
So-called Knightian uncertainty refers to the non-quantifiability of phenomena under conditions of
uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Uncertainty in decision theory is often interpreted in the sense that the
probability distribution over future events is unknown (i.e. not allowing for probabilistic calculations that
would be possible under conditions of risk), while the set of possible future states and their respective
payoffs are still known. This allows for the application of non-probabilistic computation models such as
Wald’s maximin-criterion or similar techniques (Wald, 1939, 1945). Black Swan events, as we consider
them here, require a stronger sense of uncertainty, whereunder not even the full set of potential events
or their payoffs are available to the decision maker. This notion may be seen as closer to the original
definition of uncertainty by Knight (1921), which states that “We [...] restrict the term ‘uncertainty’
to cases of the non-quantitive type.”. It should be noted, however, that the emphasis here lies on a
different, arguably even stronger point: the crux of Black Swan events, as defined herein, is not their
non-quantifiability, but the fact that they cannot be considered in the decision-making process, regardless
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of whether quantitative or any other methods are used. What we show in this paper is that there exist
events which fundamentally cannot be taken into account when making decisions and which occur
nonetheless.
In order to formalize this idea, we define a standard computational model of decision-making comprising
the following elements:
• A set A of actions which are available to the agent.
• A set P of information associated to the events (such as probabilities, or the property of occurrence).
• A utility map Γ which maps every pair of events and actions an outcome for a given agent:
Γ : (A, X)→ O. Note that if we were to take the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
Γ could be made consistent with a non-strict version of the size-relation < introduced before, as
shown in their proof. This is, however, not required for the point that we wish to make.
• A decision map Φ which maps a vector of outcomes and a vector of associated information to
the set of actions: Φ : (On, Pn) → A, where n is the cardinality of the Cartesian product A × X.
In accordance with the concept of uncertainty defined above we may assume – without loss of
generality – that there is no variation in the set of associated information P and write Φ(On) for
notational convenience.
We say that an event being non-imaginable for an agent is equivalent to her not being able to map it to
an action. We consider this as being different from deciding not to react to an event, because the latter
entails finishing the computation Γ of an outcome, which can then be mapped to whatever action would
have been chosen without knowledge of the event (one may also think of A containing another response
labeled ‘Do Nothing’). We make this distinction because it facilitates the discussion of the computational
aspects of decision-making, which we present in section 3.1, but note that it is not essential to the validity
of our argument. For now we present the definition of the decision map, which states that a given set of
events has to contain at least one imaginable event in order for it to be mapped to an action:
Φ(Γn(A, X)) =

↑ if ∀x ∈ X : ¬χ(x)
a ∈ A otherwise
,
where Γn(A, X) denotes the element-wise application of the Γ map to every element in the Cartesian
product A × X, and ↑ denotes the fact that the computation has not terminated.
3. Reasoning
Our reasoning can be compactly summarized as follows:
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Axiom 1:
There exists (at least) one event that occurs that is so bad that an event with greater consequences cannot
be imagined:
∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ∀y(x < y→ ¬χ(y)))
Axiom 2:
No matter how bad an event that occurs is, there exists an event with even greater consequences which
occurs:
∀x(ϕ(x) → ∃y(ϕ(y) ∧ x < y))
Theorem:
Black Swan events occur:
∃x(B(x) ∧ ϕ(x))
In Appendix A, we present a formal proof of the above argument using a Hilbert-style system. Here we
give a proof via semantic argument.
Proof.
By axiom 1, there exists an element x ∈ X such that:
1. ϕ(x)
2. ∀y(x < y→ ¬χ(y)).
By 1. and axiom 2 we obtain that there exists y ∈ X such that ϕ(y) and x < y. By the latter, and by 2., we
obtain ¬χ(y). Therefore we have obtained y ∈ X such that ¬χ(y) ∧ ϕ(y), that is B(y) ∧ ϕ(y). This shows
that axioms 1 and 2 imply our Theorem. 
We now move on to lay out the rationale underpinning our axioms.
3.1. Axiom 1
Axiom 1 states that all events greater than a particular event (which occurs) are beyond our imagination,
regardless of whether they occur or not. We call this argument theHoratio-Principle, after the following
quote:
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“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
- Hamlet (1.5.167-8)
It has been argued that Hamlet in this quote is talking about general limitations of human thought rather
than trying to insult Horatio’s intellect (Bradley, 1952), and some versions of the text even talk about
‘our’ instead of ‘your’ philosophy3. The Horatio-Principle here states the existence of events that are
‘not dreamt of’ in the ‘philosophy’ of a given observer, i.e. which she cannot imagine.
In order to justify the Horatio-Principle, we refer to the computation model described by the decision
map Φ introduced in section 2. As stated in the definition, the notion of being able to imagine an event
is equivalent to being able to come up with a response to that event. The decision making process could
thus be viewed as a Turing machine (Turing, 1937) that tries to compute a response to a given set of
events. In this case A would be the set of terminating states of the Turing machine, X would be the set
of alphabet symbols, which here also serves as the set of input symbols, and Φ the transition function.
As stated by the Halting problem (Turing, 1937), no such machine could be guaranteed to ever reach a
terminating state, i.e. to arrive at a decision upon a given set of events. The Horatio principle states (i)
that there exist events for which a response is not computable, which is motivated by the Halting problem.
Furthermore (ii), it states that there exists a size threshold for the consequences of an event beyond which
this holds for all events (i.e. that the computability of an event is to some extent proportional to the size of
its outcome). And lastly (iii), it states that there exists an event which does not exceed the size threshold
and which has the property of occurring. Hence, while the Halting problem does not fully extend to the
Horatio principle, we consider it a strong motivation thereof.
One may be lead to think that the possibility of deliberate Antifragility (Taleb, 2016) might induce a
type of Russell paradox (Russell, 1903) in our system: we can imagine the occurrence of a Black Swan
event and thus adjust our strategies accordingly. Antifragile strategies allow us to benefit from such an
occurrence, even though we would not be able to describe the nature of the event in advance. Our set of
imaginable events includes the occurrence of events that are not imaginable. Imagination in this case does
not specify the event itself, which would thus still be outside the set of imaginable events. According
to the Horatio-Principle, this set is still non-empty. In other words, even for (seemingly) antifragile
strategies, there exist events with large consequences for which the outcome cannot be known before
they occur.
3.2. Axiom 2
Axiom 2 states that for every event that occurs, an event that is greater occurs as well. We argue that
the set of occurring events is an open set and call this assumptionMurphy’s law, the often humorously
stated aphorism that “anything that can go wrong will go wrong”. Formally, Axiom 2 can be derived
from Murphy’s law, as expressed in our system, by using an additional assumption that set of events X is
3The Folio version of Hamlet uses ‘our’, while the first and second Quarto versions use ‘your’. While it is unclear whether
this difference stems from an editor’s mistake, it is commonly understood that the usually adopted ‘your’ is meant as a general
address and not and not as a direct attack on Horatio (Thompson and Taylor, 2014).
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an open set (the formal proof is left to the reader):
• ∀x, y(φ(x) ∧ (x < y) ⊃ φ(y))
Murphy’s law
• ∀x∃y(x < y)
Open universe
• (∀x)
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)
Axiom 2
4. Implications
In this section we show that it follows as a corollary of our Theorem that every computational model of
decision-making is incomplete in the sense that not all events can be taken into account, and that this also
concerns events that do occur.
A computational model is said to be complete if the decision map Φ has the property that for every two
sets of events which differ by at least one element Y, Z : (∃y ∈ Y : y < Z) ∨ (∃z ∈ Z : z < Y) there exist a
set of actions A and a map Γ such that Φ(Γn(A, Y)) , Φ(Γn(A, Z)). This means that a complete decision-
model always allows an agent to act differently under different circumstances if this is indicated by her
preferences, as expressed by the utility map Γ. In other words, a complete decision map Φ(Γn(A, X))
takes into account all events in X. A more refined concept of completeness with respect to occurring
events only requires this for events that have the property of occurring, which means that for Y, Z such
that ∀y ∈ Y : ϕ(y) and ∀z ∈ Z : ϕ(z), we have Φ(Γn(A, Y)) , Φ(Γn(A, Z)) if and only if Y , Z.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a computational model with a complete decision
map Φ : (On, Pn) → A, as defined above. Let S ⊆ X be a set of events which occur and which are
not imaginable (i.e. Black Swan events) for a given agent: S = {s : s ∈ X ∧ ϕ(s) ∧ ¬χ(s)}. It follows
from our theorem that the set S is non-empty. It further follows from Axiom 2 that for every event
in S there exists an event with greater consequences that occurs as well. The cardinality of S is thus
at least ℵ0. Thus there exist two vectors of unimaginable events which differ by at least one element
Y, Z ∈ S j : (∃y ∈ Y : y < Z) ∨ (∃z ∈ Z : z < Y). By the definition of Φ, both vectors are not mapped to any
response, because the computation will not terminate. Therefore it is impossible to have Φ(Γn(A, Y)) ,
Φ(Γn(A, Z)), contradicting the assumption of the existence of a complete decision-making model with
respect to occurring events. The contradiction of the existence of a complete decision-making model can
be obtained by setting S = {s : s ∈ X ∧ ¬χ(s)}.
5. Conclusion
We developed a first-order deductive system to show that the occurrence of Black Swan events is implied
by their definition. We make two assumptions, namely that our imagination is bounded and that the
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universe of occurring events is an open set, which we call the Horatio Principle and Murphy’s law,
respectively. We motivate the Horatio principle by showing that under a computational model of human
decision-making, the question of whether all events are imaginable can be reduced to the Halting problem.
We present a formal proof of our argument using a Hilbert System. We show that it follows as a corollary
of this Theorem that every computational model of decision-making is incomplete in the sense that not
all events that occur can be taken into account in the decision-making process. When viewed through
the lense of decision-making under uncertainty – as in von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory – we
argue that Black Swans entail a stronger sense of uncertainty than Knightian uncertainty because their
existence means that even under perfect information no decision criterion – regardless of whether it is of
quantitative nature or not – can make use of all the information available.
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Appendix A. Formal proof
In this section we present the formal system which in which we will establish the theorem of the occur-
rence of Black Swan events and its proof.
Appendix A.1. Hilbert System
We use a deductive system for first-order logic. This system consists of the following axioms and rules.
Appendix A.1.1. Axioms
(FO1) A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
(FO2) (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)
(FO3) A ⊃ (A ∨ B)
(FO4) B ⊃ (A ∨ B)
(FO5) (A ⊃ C) ⊃ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ∨ B ⊃ C)
(FO6) (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ ¬B) ⊃ ¬A
(FO7) ¬¬A ⊃ A
(FO8) A ∧ B ⊃ A
(FO9) A ∧ B ⊃ B
(FO10) A ⊃ B ⊃ (A ∧ B)
(FO11) A(t) ⊃ (∃x)A(x) where t can be any term
(FO12) (∀x)A(a) ⊃ A(t) where t can be any term
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Appendix A.1.2. Rules
(MP) A A⊃B
B
(R1)
C ⊃ A(x)
C ⊃ (∀x)A(x)
where the variable x must not occur free in C
(R2)
A(x) ⊃ C
(∃x)A(x) ⊃ C
where the variable x must not occur free in C
(R3) (A∧B)⊃C
B⊃A⊃C
Appendix A.2. Proof of the theorem
Using the deductive system described above, we show a proof of our theorem
Thm := (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z)) .
Our proof will be a list of formulas A1, . . . , An such that:
• An = Thm
• for every i = 1 . . . n, Ai is either one of the axioms (FO1)–(FO12), or it is one of our two axioms
Ax1 := (∃x)
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
Ax2 := (∀x)
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)
,
or it is deduced by applying one of the rules (MP),(R1)–(R3) to some formula(s) A1, . . . , Ai−1.
Proof.
1. Ax2 ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)
axiom (FO12)
2. Ax2
axiom (Ax2)
3. ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
by (MP) from 2. and 1.
4.
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)
⊃
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)]
axiom (FO1)
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5.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)
by (MP) from 3. and 4.
6.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ϕ(x)
axiom (FO8)
7.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ϕ(x)
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
axiom (FO2)
8.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
)]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
by (MP) from 6. and 7.
9.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
by (MP) from 5. and 8.
10. (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (x < y)
axiom (FO9)
11.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
axiom (FO9)
12. (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
axiom (FO12)
13.
[
(∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
⊃(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
axiom (FO1)
14.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
by (MP) from 12. and 13.
15.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
axiom (FO2)
16.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
by (MP) from 11. and 15.
17.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
by (MP) from 14. and 16.
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18.
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (x < y)
)
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (x < y)
)
axiom (FO1)
19.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (x < y)
)
by (MP) from 10. and 18.
20.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
axiom (FO9)
21.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (x < y)
)]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (x < y)
axiom (FO2)
22.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (x < y)
)]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (x < y)
by (MP) from 20. and 21.
23.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (x < y)
by (MP) from 19. and 22.
24.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
axiom (FO1)
25.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
by (MP) from 17. and 24.
26.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
axiom (FO8)
27.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
axiom (FO2)
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28.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
by (MP) from 26. and 27.
29.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
by (MP) from 25. and 28.
30.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (x < y)
]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ¬χ(y)
axiom (FO2)
31.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ¬χ(y)
by (MP) from 23. and 30.
32.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ¬χ(y)
by (MP) from 29. and 31.
33. (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ ϕ(y)
axiom (FO8)
34.
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ ϕ(y)
)
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ ϕ(y)
)
axiom (FO1)
35.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ ϕ(y)
)
by (MP) from 33. and 34.
36.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
axiom (FO9)
37.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ ϕ(y)
)]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ϕ(y)
]
axiom (FO2)
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38.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ ϕ(y)
)]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ϕ(y)
]
by (MP) from 36. and 37.
39.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ϕ(y)
by (MP) from 35. and 38.
40. ϕ(y) ⊃ ¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
axiom (FO10)
41.
(
ϕ(y) ⊃ ¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
ϕ(y) ⊃ ¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)
axiom (FO1)
42.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
ϕ(y) ⊃ ¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)
by (MP) from 40. and 41.
43.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ϕ(y)
]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
ϕ(y) ⊃ ¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)]
axiom (FO2)
44.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
ϕ(y) ⊃ ¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)]
by (MP) from 39. and 43.
45.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)
by (MP) from 42. and 44.
46.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ ¬χ(y)
]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)]
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
]
axiom (FO2)
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47.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
¬χ(y) ⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
)]
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
]
by (MP) from 32. and 46.
48.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
by (MP) from 45. and 47.
49. (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
axiom (FO11)
50.
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
)
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
)
axiom (FO1)
51.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
)
by (MP) from 49. and 50.
52.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y))
]
⊃[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
)]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
axiom (FO2)
53.
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃
(
(ϕ(y) ∧ ¬χ(y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
)]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
by (MP) from 48. and 52.
54.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
∧ (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (MP) from 51. and 53.
55. (ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (R3) from 54.
56. (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (R2) from 55.
57.
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
axiom (FO8)
16
58.
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
⊃[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
axiom (FO1)
59.
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
by (MP) from 56. and 58.
60.
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]]
⊃
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
axiom (FO2)
61.
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]]
⊃
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
by (MP) from 57. and 60.
62.
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (MP) from 59. and 61.
63.
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
axiom (FO9)
64.
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
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(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
⊃[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
axiom (FO2)
65.
[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
⊃[[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
by (MP) from 63. and 64.
66.
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ∧
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)]
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (MP) from 62. and 65.
67.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
by (R3) from 66.
68.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y))
]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]]
⊃
[[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]]
axiom (FO2)
69.
[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃
[
(∃y)(ϕ(y) ∧ (x < y)) ⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]]
⊃[(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
]
by (MP) from 9. abd 68.
70.
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (MP) from 67. and 69.
71. (∃x)
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
⊃ (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (R2) from 70.
72. ∃x
(
ϕ(x) ∧ (∀y)((x < y) ⊃ ¬χ(y))
)
axiom (Ax1)
73. (∃z)(ϕ(z) ∧ ¬χ(z))
by (MP) from 72. and 71.

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